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WARRANTLESS SEARCHES INCIDENT TO
ARREST*
Joseph G. Cook**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The determination of probable cause to search is a judicial question, and, therefore, the Supreme Court has consistently manifested a
strong preference for the use of warrants in order that the justification
for a search may be pre-evaluated by a magistrate.1 Nevertheless, the
fourth amendment condemns only searches which are unreasonable, and
its manipulative language has led to the judicial creation of numerous
exceptions to the warrant requirement,2 the most frequently employed
of which has been the search incident to an arrest, with or without an
arrest warrant.3
The justification for this exception to the warrant requirement,
where expansively employed, has never been entirely clear. One court
has opined that "[t]he searched person's privacy has already been partially invaded by the arrest; therefore, the search does not have the
personal impact that it otherwise might have." 4 However, unlike the
other generally recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the
search incident to an arrest could until recently be of a highly explora*

This article is an amplification of a section of a larger work entitled Constitutional Rights

of the Accused, to be published by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company. All rights are
reserved by the author.
** Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. A.B., 1961, J.D., 1964, University of Alabama; LL.M., 1965, Yale University.
I. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) ("[tlhe police must, whenever practicable,
obtain advanced judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure .... ").
2. See notes 145-51 infra and accompanying text.
3. Compare Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925), with Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950) (overruled by Chimel v. California);Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
See Annots., 19 A.L.R.3d 727 (1968), 82 A.L.R. 782 (1933), 74 A.L.R. 1387 (1931); 51 A.L.R.
424 (1927), 32 A.L.R. 680 (1924); Annot. 4 L. Ed. 2d 1982 (1960).
Miranda warnings [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)], or the equivalent, are not a
prerequisite to such a search. Moll v. United States, 413 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1969); People v.
Walker, 27 Mich. App. 609, 183 N.W.2d 871 (1971); Alaniz v. State, 458 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1970); Brown v. State, 443 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
4. State v. Cloman, 254 Ore. 1,_, 456 P.2d 67, 74 (1969).
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tory nature, and no less a personage than Judge Learned Hand 5expressed a serious apprehension about the exercise of this authority.
The scope of such searches, progressively expanded over the past
25 years, was severely restricted by the decision of Chimel v. California.6
This article will examine the burgeoning dimensions of the warrantless
search incident to arrest and the impact of Chimel on this investigative
tool.
II.
A.

PRE-Chimel STANDARDS

Spatial and Temporal Proximity
The very notion of a search incident to an arrest connotes spatial

contiguity and temporal proximity. To hold otherwise would eliminate
all pretense of a rational nexus between the search and the arrest and
would be tantamount to saying that an individual legally arrested
thereby forfeits all protection under the fourth amendment. The Chimel

decision has now made this point emphatically clear. 7 Several prior
decisions, however, had established limitations on the permissible di-

mensions of a search incident to arrest.
1. Spatial Contiguity.-Spatial contiguity was first raised as a
central issue in Agnello v. United States.8 The defendant was properly

arrested in the home of another for a federal narcotics offense. Following the arrest, officers went to the defendant's own residence and seized
a can of cocaine which was introduced as evidence at his trial. Noting
that the search was conducted several blocks from the scene of the

arrest, the Court concluded that it could not be sustained as incident
5. After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in search
of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable to what might be done
under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for presumably
it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis the power would not exist if the
supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to know that
one's papers are safe only so long as one is not at home. Such constitutional limitations
arise from grievances, real or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go pari
passu with the supposed evil. They withstand the winds of logic by the depth and toughness
of their roots in the past. Nor should we forget that what seems fair enough against a squalid
huckster of bad liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government determined
to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition.
United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
6. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
7. See notes 72-77 infra and accompanying text.
8. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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thereto? Agnello has frequently been cited to preclude justification of a
warrantless search as incident to arrest when the two events are some
distance apart.'" It was hardly surprising that Agnello was followed in
Stoner v. California," where the arrest occurred in Nevada and the

search in California.
Further tightening the range of potential warrantless searches,
3 both held
Shipley v. California2 and Vale v. Louisiana1
that an arrest

made in front of the residence of the defendant would not justify entering and searching the premises. 4 Conversely, in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire5 an arrest made within a house would not support the search
of an automobile in the driveway. 6 The problem of physical distance
cannot be avoided by taking the arrestee to the premises which the
officers wish to search. In James v. Louisiana,7 officers arrested the
petitioner at a street intersection when he alighted from an automobile,
whereupon they drove him to his home some two blocks away and there

carried out an intensive search which uncovered narcotics parapherna9. Id. at 34-35.
10. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Linkletter v. Walker, 323 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), affd,
381 U.S. 618 (1965); People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 698, 388 P.2d 665, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1964);
cf. Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843, 847 (8th Cir. 1932) wherein the court stated:
It would seem rather an affront to common sense to say that were officers on the
outside of a building where a murder was being committed, heard shots and screams from
within, observed a person running from the door with a smoking revolver in his hands and
they pursued him and arrested him within a hundred feet of the building where the crime
was committed and from which he had fled, that they could not search the building, but
must be content with looking over the spot where the arrest actually took place. The word
"place" as used by the Supreme Court in the Agnello Case certainly should be given no
such narrow meaning ....
I1. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
12. 395 U.S. 818 (1969).
13. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
14. Shipley was decided the same day as Chimel; Vale was decided thereafter. Both dealt
with pre-Chinel searches, and the attitude of the Court in each instance was that it was simply
applying pre-Chimel standards. Numerous lower court decisions had previously reached the same
result on analagous facts. See, e.g., United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969); Page v.
United States, 282 F.2d 807 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Zarra, 258 F. Supp. 713 (M.D. Pa.
1966).
See also United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 287
(1971); United States v. Goad, 426 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Holsey, 414 F.2d
458 (10th Cir. 1969); cf. People v. Woods, 239 Cal. App. 2d 697, 49 Cal. Rptr. 266 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
15. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (four Justices concurred in this portion of the opinion).
16. Again applying pre-Chimel standards.
17. 382 U.S. 36 (1965).
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8
lia. The Court held that the search was not incident to the arrest.
The limitations imposed by these several decisions might be evaded

by merely delaying the arrest of the suspect until he reaches an area
which officers would like to search. Inferential support for this gambit
was supplied by Hoffa v. United States, 9 where the petitioner contended
that the officers had deliberately elected not to arrest him at an earlier
time, even though they had probable cause, so that he could not claim
a deprivation of the right to counsel while inculpatory statements were
being obtained by an undercover agent."0 The Court summarily rejected

the argument with the observation, "There is no constitutional right to
be arrested." ' 21 In Chimel, one of the arguments put forward by the
petitioner was that the officers had carefully selected the scene of the
arrest to provide the most attractive opportunity to search.22 Because of

its resolution of the case, 23 the Court found it unnecessary to consider
the point.2 4 Nevertheless, a number of lower court decisions have held
the officers had waited
incident searches illegal where it was evident that
25

until the suspect-reached a particular location.
2.

Temporal Proximity.-The requirement of temporal proxim-

18. "A search 'can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous with
the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.'" Id. at 37 (quoting Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964)). See also United States v. Reincke, 229 F. Supp. 132 (D.
Conn. 1964); United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837 (D.D.C. 1957); United States v. Fowler, 17
F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
19. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
20. Petitioner cited Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964). 385 U.S. at 309.
21. 385 U.S. at 310. "The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise moment
at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment
if they act too soon, and violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long." Id.
22. 395 U.S. at 767.
23. See notes 72-77 infra and accompanying text.
24. This, however, is not to say that the Chimel holding renders the question moot. The
productiveness of a limited Chimel search may still be a function of the situs of the arrest.
25. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 291 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1961), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 370 U.S. 650 (1962); Lott v. United States, 218 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 953 (1956); United States v. Ortiz, 331 F. Supp. 514 (D.P.R. 1971); People v.
Haven, 59 Cal. 2d 713, 381 P.2d 927, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1963); O'Neil v. State, 194 So. 2d 40 (Fla.
App. 1967); cf United States v. Frazier, 304 F. Supp. 467, 473 (D. Md. 1969), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 986 (1971). Following arrest, defendant requested that he be permitted to return to his
bedroom to get dressed. Officers went with him and searched the room. Apparently, officers
intended to search the room in any event. "[W]here there is a dual purpose and the primary one is
valid while the secondary one is not, the latter does not invalidate the lawfulness of a search
conducted pursuant to such valid purpose." See also notes 122-23 infra and accompanying text.

1972]

Warrantless Searches

27
ity was at issue in Preston v. United States 6 and Stoner v. California,
both of which were decided on the same day. In Preston, the petitioner
and his companion were arrested while seated in an automobile. While
they were taken to the police station, the vehicle was taken to a garage.
A short time later, the automobile was searched and various robbery
paraphernalia were seized. The Court held that although a search of the
vehicle at the time the officers first came on the scene might have been
reasonable, the search actually carried out was too "remote in time or
place" 2 8 and was therefore illegal. In Stoner, officers thoroughly
searched the petitioner's hotel room, but did not arrest him until 2 days
later in a different state. The lower court, in upholding the search as
incident to the arrest, had reasoned that since the officers had probable
cause to arrest at the time they entered the hotel room, the search and
seizure were "part of the same transaction. ' 2 The Supreme Court reversed, finding the search "completely unrelated to the arrest, both as
to time and as to place."30 Thus, a search too long after the arrest will
not be considered incident, 31 and a search preceding an arrest by an
2
extended time period likewise will be condemned.1
Particular facts may on occasion extend the time period deemed
reasonable. For example, in Mulligan v. United States,33 while officers
were conducting a search incident to arrest, the arrestee threw something behind a stove. The officers thereupon had the stove disconnected
and retrieved what turned out to be a package of money. The entire
process, which took about 2 hours, was found to be reasonable.3 4 More

26. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
27. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
28. 376 U.S. at 367.
29. People v. Stoner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 108, 113, 22 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1962).

30. 376 U.S. at 487.
31. See, e.g., Creasy v. Leake, 422 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413
F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Clark v. Maroney, 539 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965);
State v. McMillan, 206 Kan. 3, 476 P.2d 612 (1970); Coston v. State, 252 Miss. 257, 172 So. 2d
764 (1965); Alvey v. State, - Tenn. App. -, 443 S.W.2d 518 (1969); cf.Lara v. State, 469
S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), where the defendant was first arrested on one charge and
shortly thereafter arrested on another charge. A second search following the second arrest was

sustained,
32. See United States ex rel. Mancini v. Rundle, 337 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1964); People v.
Drumright, Colo. ., 475 P.2d 329 (1970).
33. 358 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1966).
34. Id. at 607. See also, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Cox, 321 F. Supp. 284 (W.D. Va. 1971):
What is imnortant in this case is that the search was continued immediately after the
petitioner w, ,aken from the premises and not at some time distant from the arrest. Clearly
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questionable is the result in a recent Vermont decision, State v.
Oakes.35 Officers were summoned to the house of the defendant around

11 P.M. and were told by him that he had shot his wife, whose body
was lying on the floor. About 2 hours later the investigation was temporarily interrupted, and the defendant was taken to the police station.
Officers returned to the scene, without a warrant, at 6 A.M. They
returned again at 11 A.M., this time with a search warrant. The court
held that given the legality of the initial presence of the police on the
scene at the request of the defendant, the search some 5 hours later
could properly be considered a continuation of the earlier search. Indeed, the court found the warrant obtained prior to the 11 o'clock search
a "gratuitous precaution" 36 unnecessary to sustain that search. Influencing factors were the seriousness of the offense 37 and the fact that the
38
crime occurred in a small village.

In no event should Stoner be understood as categorically preclud-

ing a search which precedes an arrest from being viewed as incident
thereto. A prior search will more often than not be found unreasonable,

because it is problematical whether the officer in such a case has had
probable cause to arrest, but for the newly discovered evidence. Thus,
the arrest may in truth be incident to the search. 39 For this reason,
the search would have been permissible if the officers had compelled Kirkpatrick to sit in a
chair while they completed their looking, and it is difficult to see that the petitioner's
removal from the room would make the search illegal.
Id. at 285; State v. Downey, 104 Ariz. 375, 455 P.2d 521 (1969) (A search was begun at the time
of arrest, discontinued for 20 minutes, then continued by another officer. The court found the
267 A.2d 759, 765 (1970)
procedure reasonable.); Middletown v. State, 10 Md. App. 18, -,
("Vale would appear to allow some leeway, albeit slight, for a post-arrest warrantless search of
the arrestee's dwelling where based on truly exigent or emergency circumstances."). But see United
States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 836 (1970). "[T]he ability of a
third party to destroy evidence does not temporally expand the authority of arresting officers to
conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest. The search must be substantially contemporaneous
with the arrest."
Vt. -, 276 A.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 965 (1972).
35. 36. Id. at 25.
37. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree.
38. The small manpower of the local force must, of necessity, be supplemented by the
personnel and the expertise the state police can furnish, once they arrive. Likewise, the
prosecutor must usually be called to the scene from some other part of the county. Delay,
or interruption of police presence at the premises, on this account, does not undercut the
right of the police to complete, within a reasonable time, their investigative work, or require
a renewed authority to enter.
276 A.2d at 25.
39. "It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of
its justification." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41, 63 (1968). See also Commonwealth v. Friel,
211 Pa. Super. 11,234 A.2d 22 (1967).
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courts are quick to hold a search illegal where it appears that the arrest
was a mere pretext for carrying out a warrantless search, even where
probable cause to arrest was already present." But all Stoner held was
that "a search can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially
contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest."'" Within the scope of this rule, it is still conceivable
that a search could legitimately precede an arrest.
The issue arose again in Warden v. Hayden.12 Having probable
cause to believe that the petitioner had committed armed robbery and
was now in his residence, the officers entered the house without a warrant, spread out, and searched for him and weapons. The petitioner was
found in a bed on the second floor. Meanwhile, another officer found a
shotgun and pistol hidden in a toilet, and another found some of the
clothing worn during the robbery in a washing machine. Other items
were found in the bedroom. The temporal sequence of these various
discoveries was not clear, but in the mind of the Court, it made no
difference. First, the entry to the residence without a warrant was reasonable under the circumstances. 3 Second, "[t]he permissible scope of
the search" was "as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent

40. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Williams v. United States, 418
F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969), affd, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739 (6th
Cir. 1963); Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 844, 846 (2d Cir. 1961) ("The mere fact that the arrest
was not unlawful does not give law enforcement officers carte blanche to rummage about at will
in any home or other place where an arrest is made and then seek to justify their conduct by a
blanket statement that the 'search' made by them was incidental to an arrest."); Drayton v. United
States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953); State v. Anonymous, 29 Conn. Supp. 153, 276 A.2d 448 (Super.
Ct. 1971); State v. Roach, 256 La. 408, 236 So. 2d 782 (1970); Coston v. State, 252 Miss. 257,
172 So. 2d 764 (1965) (authority to check driver's license cannot be used as a subterfuge to search).
But see State v. Sedecca, 252 Md. 207, 221-22, 249 A.2d 456, 465 (1969). Officers had received a
tip that the defendant was transporting untaxed cigarettes. They followed him until he broke a
traffic law, whereupon they arrested him and in the course of checking the automobile serial
number were able to observe some cigarettes and arrested him for this offense as well. While
acknowledging the general principle that the arrest could not be used as a pretext for a search, the
court held, "The trooper who checked the serial number on the door had two motives, one to make
a bona fide and routine check of the serial number, the other to ascertain if possible in the usual
and normal course of that check of the serial number, what was contained in the rear portion of
the vehicle."
41. 376 U.S. at 486.
42. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
43. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of
an investigation, if to do so would greatly endanger their lives or the lives of others. Speed
here was essential, and only a thorough search of the house for persons and weapons could
have insured that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all
weapons that could be used against them or to effect an escape.
Id. at 298-99.
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the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape."'44
Third, as to the order of events, "the seizures occurred prior to or

immediately contemporaneous with Hayden's arrest, as part of an effort
to find a suspected felon, armed, within the house to which he had run
only minutes before the police arrived."45 The seizures were thus reasonable. The Court was not impressed by the argument made by the peti-

tioner that looking in a washing machine could not be justified as an
effort to locate the suspect or weapons. Even assuming that the only
legitimate objects of search were the suspect and weapons, and not
clothing,46 it could not be said that the officer was not looking for
weapons in the washing machine.47
In the Hayden case, then, the Supreme Court held for the first time,
without elaboration, that a search may under appropriate circumstances
precede an arrest and still be seen as reasonably incident thereto. Indeed, the holding leaves open the possibility that the seizures would have
been legal even if the petitioner had not been on the premises and, thus,
no arrest had been immediately made.48 For such a result it may be
assumed that the exigent circumstances-the reasonable belief that the

perpetrator of a violent crime is presently within the premises-become
critical. Numerous decisions by lower courts indicate that a search preceding an arrest is permissible if the two events are substantially contemporaneous and if it is clear that the officer had probable cause to
arrest prior to the search.49

44.
45.
46.

Id. at 299.
Id.
The Court left open the possibility that such was not the limits of permissible search.

Id.
47. In this respect, Hayden would appear to be overruled by Chimel.
48. Similarly, a search may be justified as incident to an arrest, even though an arrest is not
made but could have been made. See People v. Gavin, 21 Cal. App. 3d 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. 518 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
49. This matter, at least as regards a search of the person of the arrestee, was quite sensibly
explained by Justice Harlan, concurring in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 77 (1968):
Of course, the fruits of the search may not be used to justify an arrest to which it is incident,
but this means only that probable cause to arrest must precede the search. If the prosecution
shows probable cause to arrest prior to the search of a man's person, it has met its total
burden. There is no case in which a defendant may validly say, "Although the officer had
a right to arrest me at the moment when he seized me and searched my person, the search
is invalid because he did not in fact arrest me until afterwards."
See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 439 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Maynard, 439
F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Skinner 412 F.2d 98 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
967 (1969); Henderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906
(1969); United States v. Lucas, 360 F.2d 937 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 875 (1966); Holt v.
Simpson, 340 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Devenere, 332 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1964);
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The Stoner and Hayden cases, reaching opposite conclusions, provide comparative standards by which police conduct may be evaluated.
Each involved a dramatic fact situation in which a reasonable conclusion was reached. When the arrest is not made immediately following
the search, these decisions are normally employed to determine reasonableness. If, as in Hayden, the officers could be said to be in "hot pur-

suit," then the incidental discovery of incriminating evidence would
probably be sustained." But when officers enter the residence of a defendant, purportedly for the purpose of arresting him, and, not finding

him there, carry out a search, and then patiently await his return, at
which point they arrest him, a number of courts have held the search
not supportable as incident to the arrest even though both the arrest and
search would have been valid if the officers had found the defendant
present upon their initial entry.52 A particularly interesting case, because

it shares characteristics of both Stoner and Hayden, is People v.

Olszowy1 3 In that case officers held a warrant for the arrest of the
defendants on a charge of rape. Receiving no response at the defendants'
apartment, they forced their way in and searched all areas in which a
person might be hidden. The complainant, who claimed she had bled
profusely during the attack, was brought into the apartment where she
indicated the bed where the assault had occurred. Although the linens
Jones v. State, 246 Ark. 1048, 441 S.W.2d 458 (1969); People v. King, 5 Cal. 3d 458, 487 P.2d
1032, 96 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1971); State v. Harding, 184 Neb. 159, 165 N.W.2d 723 (1969); Warden
v. State, 214 Tenn. 314, 379 S.W.2d 788 (1964); Brown v. State, 443 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Crim. App.
1969).
50. See 387 U.S. at 297-98.
51. See United States v. DeBose, 410 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920
(1971) (facts analagous to Hayden); State v. Jemison, 14 Ohio St. 2d 47, 236 N.E.2d 538 (1968)
(Officers with an arrest warrant were searching for the defendant at his residence when they came
upon a body.).
52. See, e.g., Mosco v. United States, 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 842
(1962) (arrest about 30 minutes after the search); People v. Bussie, 41 I11. 2d 323, 243 N.E.2d 196
Iowa ___ 178 N.W.2d 329 (1970)
(1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 819 (1969); State v. Smith, (facts analagous to Stoner); Gross v. State, 235 Md. 429, 201 A.2d 808 (1964) (facts analogous to
Stoner). See also People v. O'Neil, II N.Y.2d 148, 153, 182 N.E.2d 95, 98, 227 N.Y.S.2d 416,
419 (1962) ("The search cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest, for it was commenced
several hours before defendant, who was at all times present, was arrested."); Commonwealth v.
Smyser, 205 Pa. Super. 599, 211 A.2d 59 (1965); cf.the dubious pronouncement in People v. Evans,
3 Mich. App. 1,4, 141 N.W.2d 668, 669 (1966) that "[iun Michigan, the validity of a search and
seizure without a warrant is not dependent upon a prior valid arrest." Here officers had confronted
the defendant under suspicious circumstances in an alley in the early morning, and seized a number
of bottles of liquor on his person and in a sack he was carrying. He was taken into custody but
not charged with larceny until 2 days later. The search was upheld.
53. 47 Misc. 2d 859, 263 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Erie County Ct. 1965).

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 24:607

were clean, a further search of the premises revealed the soiled sheets
in a clothes hamper and a pill, which complainant said had been in her
pocket, on the floor. One defendant was arrested 3 hours later at a
tavern, and the other surrendered sometime thereafter. Even though the
warrant under which the officers were acting when they entered the

apartment was an arrest warrant and not a search warrant, the court
held the search reasonable.
B.

4

Intensity
Prior to Chimel, the Supreme Court had recognized that an other-

wise valid search might be illegal because of its unreasonable intensity.
The extreme case was Kremen v. United States," in which, incident to
an arrest, officers apparently seized the entire contents of a cabin." The

Court held the search to be unreasonable. 57 A similar result was reached
in Von Cleefv. New Jersey8 where, incident to an arrest for maintaining
a building for the purpose of lewdness, "several policemen proceeded
to search the entire house for a period of about three hours,"'59 and
seized several thousand articles. Condemnation of undue intensity may

also be found in decisions of lower courts."
The reasonableness of the intensity of a search is partially a func-

tion of the offense for which an arrest is made. For example, in United
States v. Cally,6" the court found a search carried out by five officers
unreasonable where the defendant was a 68-year-old man arrested for
tax evasion allegedly having occurred some 5 or 6 years prior to the
arrest. And in People v. Alexander, 2 the court found that ripping up
54. Id. at 860, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
55. 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
56. An itemization of the property seized occupies 11 pages of fine print in the official report.
Id. at 349-59.
57. Id. at 347. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968): "This court has held in the
past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue
of its intolerable intensity and scope." (citing Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957)).
58. 395 U.S. 814 (1969).
59. Id. at 815.
60. In addition to the cases cited notes 61-63, 66-68, 70 infra, see United States v. Masiello,
434 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Magel, 4 Cal. App. 3d 458, 84 Cal. Rptr. 353 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1970); Willett v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 555, 83 Cal. Rptr. 22 (4th Dist. Ct. App.
1969); People v. Bowen, 29 I11.
2d 349, 194 N.E.2d 316 (1963); State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 373
P.2d 392 (1962) (dicta).
61. 259 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
62. 21 111. 2d 347, 172 N.E. 2d 785 (1961).
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the linoleum in the defendant's apartment incident to her arrest for a
63
narcotics offense was a bit extreme.

Two decisions which authorized a very expansive power of search
incident to arrest-Harrisv. United States 4 and United States v.
Rabinowitz6 -were both overruled by Chimel. In Harristhe defendant
was arrested in the living room of his apartment pursuant to two warrants involving charges of fraud. He was handcuffed and the entire
apartment was searched, ostensibly to find two cancelled checks and any
other evidence relevant to the charge. During a 5-hour search, a sealed
envelope was found marked "George Harris, personal papers," within

which the officers found eight selective service classification cards. This
evidence, which bore no relation to the reason for the arrest, was used
in the present prosecution. While acknowledging the Agnello standard
of reasonableness, the Court held that the search in the instant case need
not be limited to the very room in which the arrest was consummated.

Rather, the defendant was in "exclusive possession" of a "four-room
apartment," and the search of the entire premises was therefore reason-

able. Harris was a popular decision in the lower courts, frequently
employed to uphold searches of a far-reaching nature;" however, there
63. See also Matthews v. United States, 407 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1969). Distinguishing
Kremen, the court said:
Significant here is the ease with which certain quantities of marijuana can be concealed,
the clandestine nature and places of possible concealment, the difficulty in finding it under
these circumstances, the wide ranging nature of the conspiracy, and the breadth of evidentiary data relevant thereto.
Ala. App. -, 250 So. 2d 605 (Crim. App. 1971); State v. Dodd,
Id. at 1382; Neal v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 137 N.W.2d 465, 468 (1965) ("A search which might be reasonable as
incidental to an arrest for one crime may be entirely unreasonable as an incident to an arrest for
another crime.").
64. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
65. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
66. See Porter v. Ashmore, 421 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 981 (1971);
United States v. Valdes, 417 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1969); Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 159
(9th Cir. 1969), affd, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 885 (1968); Haas v. United States, 344 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1965); Bartlett v. United
States, 232 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1956); James v. United States, 191 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 948 (1952); United States v. Braggs, 189 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1951); United States
v. Spadafora, 181 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 897 (1950).
In United States v. Riso, 405 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 959 (1969),
defendant was arrested without a warrant, for being in possession of a stolen painting. When the
officer called defendant by name and told him he was under arrest, defendant dropped his package
[the painting] into the trunk of his car and slammed it shut. The officer used defendant's key to
open the trunk and seized the package. The search was held reasonable per Harris. "[Slince the
arresting agent saw the package before the trunk of the auto was slammed shut, he did not violate
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by opening the trunk to retrieve the package." Id. at 137.
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are cases in which even the authority of Harriswas found to have been
exceeded.7
Beyond the issue of the range of the search, the Harris Court also
directed its attention to the intensity level of the search resulting in a
discovery of the selective service cards. The Court noted that the reasonableness of the method of search depends upon the items being sought.

Here the officers were looking for items which by their very nature
would likely be in a secluded location, and therefore a search of this
intensity was justifiable. "The same meticulous investigation which
would be appropriate in a search for two small cancelled checks could
not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen auto-

mobile or an illegal still. ' ' "8
Finally, the fact that the evidence uncovered was not related to the

crimes for which the defendant was arrested was inconsequential. Once
it was established that the search itself was legal, the officers were
67. See Drayton v. United States, 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953):
The search here involved transcends even the doctrine of the Harris case, which appears to
be the apogee of the Supreme Court decisions on search of a dwelling without a warrant. . . .Here, room No. 5, in which the contraband was found, was wholly unconnected
with the room in which the arrest was made. It was on another floor, and in another part
of the building. To reach it from the room where the arrest was made, it was necessary for
the officers to go through the downstairs hall, up the stairway to the second floor, and down
that hall until room No. 5 was reached. It was then necessary to unlock No. 5 with the key
which the officers had demanded that the defendant produce, and which the defendant
yielded involuntarily. To sanction this search, even as an incident to a lawful arrest, would
extend the doctrine of the Harris case too far.
Id. at 37; Gilbert v. United States, 291 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1961), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 370 U.S. 650 (1962) (court acknowledged that incident to an arrest the search is not
limited to the room in which the arrest occured but held the case distinguishable from Harris,
because (1)the government already had the evidence on which the arrest warrant was based and,
therefore, the search was unnecessary and (2) there was some indication that the arresting officers
waited until the defendant was on the premises to make the arrest so that the search would be
possible); People v. Gonzalez, 33 App. Div. 2d 762, 305 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1969) (search of storeroom
separate from and having no direct access to restaurant in which the defendant was arrested, was
unreasonable and constitutionally unjustified; challenged evidence suppressed).
68. 331 U.S. at 152. See also United States v. Thomson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940):
[N]either the length of the search at the time of the arrest, nor the volume of the evidence
seized has anything to do with the validity of the search. One single bit of evidence, no larger
than a half-carat diamond, may be all that is seized in one case. Thirteen truck loads of
liquor, still apparatus, etc., may be taken in another case. The smuggled diamond may be
so skillfully concealed that much time is required for the searching officers to locate it,
whereas the defendant may be sitting in his still house surrounded by vats of liquor, in the
second search, and no time at all required to complete the search. In other words, the
reasonableness of the search depends upon the facts in each case, and this applies to the
length of the search and the quantity seized.
Id. at 645; cf.Caver v. Kropp, 306 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (E.D. Mich. 1969). Defendant was arrested
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authorized to take any items discovered which were subject to seizure. 6
In Rabinowitz the defendant was arrested for offenses related to
forged postage stamps. Incident to the arrest the officers "searched the

desk, safe, and file cabinets in the office for about an hour and a half,"7 0
and seized 573 stamps with forged overprints. Again, the Court found

7
the search reasonable. '

III.

THE

Chimel CASE

The facts in Chimel v. California2 were as follows: Officers went

to the home of the petitioner to arrest him pursuant to a warrant for
burglary. The petitioner's wife met them at the door and allowed them

to enter and await the petitioner's return from work some 10 or 15
minutes later. He was thereupon arrested, and the officers asserted their
authority, over the petitioner's objection, to search the house. For the
next 45 minutes to an hour, they proceeded to search the entire three-

bedroom house, including the attic, garage, and workshop. Numerous
items believed to be fruits of the burglary were seized. Gratuitously

observing that in regard to warrantless searches incident to an arrest
"[t]he decisions of this Court bearing upon that question have been far
from consistent, ' 7 3 the Court reviewed the history of the doctrine and

concluded that the judicial preference accorded warrant searches compelled it to retreat from the broad authorization of recent decisions. 74
for attempted rape. The court felt that "[tihere [was] no reasonable connection between the charges
which form the basis for the arrest and the possible contents of the small envelopes."
69. 331 U.S. at 154-55. The Court acknowledged that the limits imposed by the Gouled rule,
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921), were no longer applicable. See Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
70. 339 U.S. at 59.
71. As a basis for its opinion, the Court gave weight to the following factors: (I) The search
and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place of the search was a business room to which
the public, including the officers, were invited; (3) the room was small and under the immediate
and complete control of respondent; (4) the search did not extend beyond the room used for
unlawful purposes; (5) the possession of the forged and altered stamps was a crime, just as it is a
crime to possess burglars' tools, lottery tickets or counterfeit money. Id. at 64.
72. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
73. Id. at 755; see Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960), where the Court noted,
"The several cases on this subject. . . cannot be satisfactorily reconciled." See also United States
v. Cally, 259 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
74. The Court particularly noted language in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), that "the
police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure," id. at 20, and that "[t]he scope of the search must be 'strictly
tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible," id. at 19. 395
U.S. at 762.
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The holding concluded that incident to an arrest an officer could, first,
search the person arrested 5 to remove any weapons that might be em-

ployed in resisting arrest or escaping and any evidence which might be
subject to concealment or destruction. Second, the officer could search
"the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon
or evidentiary items . . . . , Any search extending beyond these limits
would be deemed unreasonable. It followed that Harrisand Rabinowitz
were overruled.

77

IV. POST-Chimel STANDARDS
A.

The Person of the Arrestee

In regard to the first aspect of the Chimel standard, the authority
of an officer to make a complete search of the arrestee has never been

seriously questioned. 7 A number of decisions indicate that a search of

the person of the suspect may be delayed from the time of the arrest
until he is taken to the police station and still be reasonable. 7 This is
particularly true when the suspect is to be jailed, whereupon a complete

inventory and seizure of his personal possessions is acknowledged as
75. 395 U.S. at 763. The authority following an arrest is to search,not merelyfrisk; cf.Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk).
See LaFave, Street Encounters:and the Constitution. Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67
MIcH. L. REv. 40, 91 (1968).
76. 395 U.S. at 763.
77. "Rabinowitz and Harris have been the subject of critical commentary for many years,
and have been relied upon less and less in our own decisions. It is time, for the reasons we have
stated, to hold on their own facts, and insofar as the principles they stand for are inconsistent with
those that we have endorsed today, they are no longer to be followed." Id. at 768.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); United States ex rel. Walls v.
Mancusi, 406 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 958 (1969); Drayton v. United States, 205
F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1953); People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App. 3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Brown v. State, 230 So. 2d 177 (Fla. App. 1970); Thacker v. State, 226 Ga. 170, 173
S.E.2d 186 (1970); Campbell v. State, - Tenn. App. , 447 S.W.2d 877 (1969). See also
Hurst v. United States, 425 F.2d 177 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 843 (1970): "A warrant
had been issued for the arrest of one of the men, Bobby Roy Bush. Officers apprehended the car
and, as they did not know which man was Bush, they arrested both Bush and his companion, the
appellant . . .and, finding a pistol and ammunition arrested him for carrying a concealed
weapon." 425 F.2d at 178 (arrest and search were upheld); Johnson v. State, Miss. -, 145
So. 2d 156 (1962), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 372 U.S. 702 (1963). Appellant conceded
that search of her companion's car was properly incident to his arrest, which was lawful, but
asserted that her arrest at that time was illegal because without probable cause or warrant. However, the searching officers did not know at the time of the search that the bag in question belonged
to her. This fact did not invalidate an otherwise lawful search of the contents of the car. The officers
had authority to search everything in the car unless they were forewarned that the bag belonged
to someone else. Cf. Gustafson v. State, 243 So. 2d 615 (Fla. App. 1971).
79. See, e.g., United States v. James, 432 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
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reasonable.8" Presumably, these decisions have not been repudiated by
Chimel.8 '
B.

The Area Within Reach

1. The Basic Ambiguity.-By permitting a search to encompass
"the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon

or evidentiary items, '8 2 the Court postulated an ambiguity which has
contributed substantially to the inconsistencies appearing in lower court
decisions. The essence of the problem is this: Is the standard properly
understood to define an area of specified radius with the arrestee at its
center, or is this a purposive definition with each case to be evaluated
in terms of the capability of the arrestee to reach a weapon or eviden-

tiary item?
The area test has much to be said in its favor in terms of establishing a reasonably objective standard which would be more understandable to the law enforcement officer. It helps to eliminate hopeless factual
disputes over what the officer thought the arrestee might be "going for"
906 (1971); Bailey v. United States, 404 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (suspect thwarted original
efforts to search him); United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d 184, 185-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 862 (1966) ("The appellant's contention means that the seizure of his clothing could have been
immediately on his arrest, he had been stripped to the buff on the
made constitutionally only if,
public highway. Even though that April 13th may have been a very pleasant spring day, we are of
the opinion that the argument is somewhat extreme."); United States v. Margeson, 246 F. Supp.
219 (D. Me. 1965), affd, 361 F.2d 327 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 830 (1966) (Officer
examined suspect's shoes, stating that he was seizing, them, then gave them back to him to wear
until they reached the station. The court found the seizure reasonable, as incident to the arrest.);
People v. Shaw, 237 Cal. App. 2d 606, 47 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (seizure of
suspect's underwear in rape case after arrival in police station was reasonable); United States v.
Dyson, 277 A.2d 658 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971) (transporting officer can search for weapon); State v.
Aiken, 228 So. 2d 442 (Fla. App. 1969). But see Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1971).
Similarly, a search delayed only long enough for the arresting officer to summon assistance
is not unreasonable. Kirby v. Cox, 435 F.2d 684 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,92 S. Ct. 118 (1971).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Taggert, 334 F. Supp. 206 (D. Del. 1971); People v. GlaubInd. - 266 N.E.2d 212 (1971);
485 I-.2d 711 (1971); Farrie v. State, Colo. .
man, Wright v. State, - Miss. _ 236 So. 2d 408 (1970). See also United States v. Blackburn,
389 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1968) (police sending to motel or hotel for arrestee's personal effects for
itemizing and storing approved).
81. See United States v. Deleo, 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970);
Miss. -, 236 So. 2d 408
McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971); Wright v. State, (1970), dismissed, 401 U.S. 929 (1971).
82. 395 U.S. at 763.
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when he reacted in a furtive manner.8 3 Indeed, since this approach is
based on spatial considerations, if the point of arrest could be accurately
determined, in many instances a return to the scene at a later time would
permit an after-the-fact evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular
search.
On the other hand, it may well be argued that such a standard
sacrifices the policy basis of Chimel for the practical expedience of a
narrowly defined rule. The area standard differs only in degree from
Rabinowitz and Harris; the arresting officers still have a license for an
exploratory search, albeit one of substantially delimited parameters.
The intent of the Chimel Court was to make a change in purpose, not
mere degree. The warrantless search incident to arrest is justified because the safety of the officer may be jeopardized, the potential for
escape by the arrestee should be minimized, and the possibility of evidentiary destruction should be eliminated. Insofar as a search is supportable for one of these purposes, it is sanctioned by Chimel; if no real
threat of this nature is presented, then the spatial relationship of arrestee
and object is immaterial.
The operational distinction between these approaches can be observed. In People v. Perry84 the defendant was arrested in a room,
handcuffed, and taken into the corridor. A subsequent search of an open
dresser drawer and a purse in the room was sustained, "since it was
within the area from which defendant could have obtained a weapon or
something that could have been used as evidence against him." 85 Con5
the New York Court of Appeals held that
versely, in People v. Floyd"
nothing is within "grabbing distance" once the arrestee has been handcuffed.8 7 The inconsistency between these two decisions is a product of
the courts' fundamental misunderstanding of the Chimel holding. While
the source of disagreement has apparently not been recognized by any
83. See Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559,
568 (1970):
It is submitted that the majority opinion in that case [Chimel] is so overbroad that: (1)the
most conscientious policeman, desiring to act properly, in many cases simply cannot know
whether his conduct is proper or not; and (2) any judge applying Chimel to a given case
has such latitude for interpretation that almost any arrest-based search could be held to be
a Chimel violation if the sitting judge saw fit to do so. This second result is of tremendous
importance to the working policeman in his decision making process, for he must consider
that certain judges will interpret his conduct strictly against him, no matter what the facts
of the case.
2d 402, 266 N.E.2d 330 (1971).
84. 47 I11.
85. Id. at 408, 266 N.E.2d at 333. See also State v. Johnson, 463 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1971).
86. 26 N.Y.2d 558, 260 N.E.2d 815, 312 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1970).
87. Id. at 563, 260 N.E.2d at 817, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 195.

1972]

Warrantless Searches

court, its realization does much to explain the otherwise inexplicable

conflict evident in a substantial portion of the search incident to arrest
cases.
2. Search Subsequent to Seizure.-A principal manifestation of
this dichotomy of decisions is found in those instances where an item is

seized at the time of arrest but not searched until later. For example,
8 officers seized a suitcase which was within the
in Malone v. Crouse"

immediate control of the defendant at the time of his arrest. A search
at the police station an hour or so later in the presence of the defendant
was found reasonable."9 Similarly, in Evalt v. United States,9 at the
time of the defendant's arrest the sheriff legally searched a packsack in
the possession of the defendant and discovered what he believed to be
stolen money. The defendant and the packsack were then taken into
custody. Sometime later, an FBI agent was allowed to go through the
packsack to compare the serial numbers on the currency with those
reportedly stolen from a bank. The court held that since the initial
seizure of the packsack was valid, it was legally in the custody of the

sheriff, and allowing the federal agent to examine it was not unreasonable." Post-Chimel decisions have continued to sustain such searches. In
United States v. Mehciz92 the defendant was arrested and handcuffed,

after which the suitcase he was carrying was searched. The court found
the procedure unobjectionable. United States v. Lipscomb

held a delayed search under similar circumstances.

4

3

also up-

Not mentioned in

Lipscomb, however, was an earlier decision by the same court, Brett v.
United States,95 which had held that when the police have custody of a
88. 380 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 968 (1968).
89. Id. at 744. A comparable result on analagous facts was reached in United States v.
Robbins, 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 985 (1971). But see dissent: "The
proposition that this subsequent search can be considered a continuation of the first search completely ignores the Supreme Court's express limitation that 'a search can be incident to an arrest
on113' if it is substantially contemporaneouswith the arrestand is confined to the immediate vicinity
of the arrest." (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964)) (emphasis added). Id. at
60.
90. 382 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1967).
91. Id. at 427. See also People v. Robertson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 99, 49 Cal. Rptr. 345 (4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1966), where the defendant refused to allow the officers to search his zippered and
locked bag at the time of his arrest.
92. 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
93. 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 980 (1971).
94. "Although the situation may indeed arise in which the police, rather than follow the strict
requirements of Chimnel for warrantless searches incident to an arrest, simply seize personal property and attempt to search it later under the guise of a station-house inventory, that case is not
now before us." 435 F.2d at 801.
95. 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969).
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prisoner's property merely for its protection while he is incarcerated, the
fourth amendment protection of privacy as interpreted in Katz v. United
97
States" precludes a search of his belongings without a warrant.
More questionable is the case where, as a result of a valid search
incident to arrest, a baggage check is found on the person of the arrestee, and subsequently the officers present the check to the bailee, thereby
gaining possession of the defendant's property. A variant situation involves the discovery of a key to a locker at the time of the arrest and a
subsequent search of the locker. Pre-Chimel decisions have sanctioned
such seizures."8 However, the decisions are not unanimous,99 and the
continued vitality of such holdings in light of Chimel would seem dubious.' 00
3. Expanding the Parametersof "Reach."-The Chimel limitation restricting the search beyond the arrestee to the area within his
reach is acknowledged as severely narrowing the authority to search,'
and its effect is widely reflected in the decisions of lower courts. For
102 an officer
example, in People v. Machroli
responded to a call and
arrested the defendant for battery in conjunction with a domestic disturbance. The officer handed him some clothing and observed him remove a small white box from his trousers pocket and place it on the
dresser. The officer thereupon picked up the box and found within it
some unidentifiable tablets which were seized and later determined to
be illegally possessed narcotics. The court cited Chimel in holding the
search unreasonable. Again, in State v. Rhodes' officers went to the
defendant's home with an arrest warrant for a drug offense. While
making the arrest the officer observed a dark spot "in the bowl of the
light fixture in the living room,"'0 4 whereupon he removed the bowl and
found some marijuana cigarettes. The court found the search outside the
96. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
97. "We are not prepared to say that an accused whose effects are held by the police for
safekeeping has, by the single fact alone of the police custody of the property, surrendered his
expectations of the privacy of these effects." 412 F.2d at 406.
98. See United States v. Blassick, 422 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 985
(1971); Kanick v. United States, 242 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Wilson, 163 F.
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
99. See McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (key to automobile
trunk); People v. Perez, 219 Cal. App. 2d 760, 33 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
100. But see State v. Mejia, La. ,242 So. 2d (1971).
101. See, e.g., State v. O'Steen, 238 So. 2d 434, 437 (Fla. App. 1970).
102. 44 Ii. 2d 222, 254 N.E.2d 450 (1969).
103. 80 N.M. 729, 460 P.2d 259 (1969).
104. Id. at _
, 460 P.2d at 259 (quoting officer's testimony).
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"area of defendant's immediate control" per Chimel.15
Nevertheless, there appears to be a clear tendency on the part of

many courts to stretch the limits of Chimel in an effort to legitimize
searches. The crux of the problem usually involves determining the
scope of the phrase "immediate control" of the arrestee. 10 An occasional decision, notwithstanding Chimel, has permitted a complete

search of the room in which the arrest occurred, 107 and at least two
courts have allowed the search of an entire apartment. 8 The validity
of such results is highly questionable." 9
Of greater interest are those cases which take more seriously the
requirement of immediacy and demand a precise factual analysis. It has
been held in such cases that where the defendant is arrested while lying
105. Id. at _ 460 P.2d at 260 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1968)).
See also United States v. Colbert, 454 F.2d 801 (1972); United States v. Jiminez-Badilla, 434 F.2d
170 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Armpriester, 416 F.2d 28 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1046 (1970).
106. 395 U.S. at 763. In Berlin v. State, 19 Md. App. 48, 57, 277 A.2d 468, 473 (1971), a
Maryland court said: "The area of immediate control cannot be measured in feet or by an arm's
length, but is to be measured reasonably with respect to the accessibility of the articles and their
Colo. 489 P.2d 593 (1971).
nature." See also People v. Vigil, 107. Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969); People v. Perry, 47 I11.2d 402, 266 N.E.2d
Miss.
330 (1971); Murphy v. State, Miss. _
239 So. 2d 162 (1970); Brewer v. State, -,
228 So. 2d 582 (1969).
108. Hernandez v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 3d 169, 173-74, 93 Cal. Rptr. 816, 818-19
(Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1971): "Chimel . . . was not meant, we are convinced, to protect persons in
possession of contraband or the contraband within a house when evidence of its presence is shown
at the moment of the arrest." In Thornton v. State, 451 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970),
officers went to one bedroom apartment to make arrest for armed robbery. In the apartment, they
found eight men and one woman. A search incident to the arrest disclosed (I) a driver's license
and social security card of the victim in the toilet, (2) a revolver and a large amount of change in
some trousers in a closet, (3) a pistol and watch in a dresser drawer, and (4) another pistol under
the mattress. "Chinel is distinguishable. There, the officers were searching for stolen coins and
property taken in the burglary. In the present case officers under this record were justified after
their entry in searching the apartment for the pistols for their own protection." Id. at 901.
109. See generally People v. Valasquez, 3 Cal. App. 3d 776, 83 Cal. Rptr. 916 (5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1970). involving the search of a bar, where Chimel was distinguished to obliteration:
The distinctions between the two cases are numerous and include, among others: (1) The
. . . search was limited to the specific locations where the officers had observed appellant
dig and reach for what they had every reason to believe was narcotics; (2) unlike our case,
neither Chimel nor his wife did anything in the presence or observation of the officers to
indicate that they were committing a felony or attempting to hide or dispose of the evidence
of a felony which either had committed; and (3) in Chinel, where the alleged burglary had
been committed sometime prior to the day of arrest, it would have been no more difficult
for the officers to have obtained a search warrant than it was to obtain the warrant of arrest
and to have served both warrants simultaneously. In our case, the felony was being committed in the presence of the officers.
Id. at 784-85, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
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on a bed, a wallet partially exposed beneath a pillow,110 a duffel bag or
box at the foot of the bed,"' and even items beneath the bed"' are

seizable. Courts have also upheld the search of a coat hanging at an
unspecified distance from the arrestee," 3 and a pair of pants draped

over a chair 6 feet away. 14 Finally, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has construed "within reach" to mean "within lunge.""'

4. Floating Areas.-Particular circumstances may legitimize a
search covering a far greater area than Chimel would appear to permit.
It may be assumed that Warden v. Hayden"' remains good authority
for the principle that officers with probable cause to arrest may, if

necessary, forcibly enter premises in which they have reason to believe
the potential arrestee is hiding; and any seizable evidence they reasona-

bly discover in the process of looking for him may be taken. Thus, if
the arrestee were found in the first room, any exploratory search beyond

this point would not be tolerated; if he were found in the last room, a
survey of the entire premises would be legitimate. Courts may be expected to look with a wary eye, however, upon any procedures appearing
to delay the discovery of the arrestee as long as possible. So instead of

viewing the search as incident to an arrest, as the Hayden Court did,
firmer reliance may be placed on the "plain view" exception: officers

legitimately on the premises for the purpose of making an arrest need

110. United States v. Russell, 315 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
11I. People v. Spencer, 22 Cal. App. 3d 786, 99 Cal. Rptr. 681 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
People v. Arvizu, 12 Cal. App. 3d 726, 90 Cal. Rptr. 895 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
112. People v. King, 5 Cal. 3d 458, 487 P.2d 1032, 96 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1971); People v. Doss,
44 I11.
2d 541, 256 N.E.2d 753 (1970).
264 N.E.2d 753 (1970); State v. Fulford,
I11.
App. 2d _113. People v. Keelen, 187 N.W.2d 270 (1971).
Minn. -,
114. Simberg v. State, 288 Minn. 175, 179 N.W.2d 141 (1970). See also People v. Belvin,
275 Cal. App. 2d 955, 958-59, 80 Cal. Rptr. 382, 384 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
115. Scott v. State, 7 Md. App. 505, 513, 256 A.2d 384, 389 (1969):
But as the search is tested by its reasonableness and its scope is justified by the need to
protect the arresting officer and to prevent the destruction of evidence, we cannot construe
Chimel to mean that the area is confined to that precise spot which is at arm length from
the arrestee at the moment of his arrest. He may well lunge forward or move backward or
to the side and thus into an area in which he might grab a weapon or evidentiary items then
within his reach before the officer could, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, restrain
him. We think that Chimel requires that the State show that the search was conducted and
items were seized in an area "within the reach" of the arrestee in this concept, as for
example, by evidence as to the location of the items with respect-to the whereabouts of the
arrestee, the accessibility of the items and their nature.
See also Grimes v. State, 244 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1971), where a gun could have been reached
"with a couple of good steps."
116. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
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not ignore seizable evidence coming within plain view. The preferability
of this approach over the incident to arrest rationale is apparent if one
considers the possibility that in the Hayden case the officers might not
have found the suspect at all. If there was probable cause to believe
Hayden was on the premises, but the officers were simply mistaken,
there still would have been every reason to sustain the seizure of the
evidence, since the presence of probable cause is not determined by a
retrospective evaluation of whether the officers were right." 7 On the
other hand, obviously a search cannot be sustained as incident to an
arrest if there is no arrest. The plain view doctrine was used to avoid
such an impasse in People v. Eddington,"8 where officers entered the
apartment of the defendant with probable cause to arrest him and "a
reasonable belief that defendant was home."'1 Although he was not at
home, the seizure of a shoe which matched a print left at the scene of
the crime was sustained.
When the arrestee is at home and is located with little or no effort,
a walk through the remainder of the premises may be legitimate when
the officers reasonably believe confederates might be hidden. Again, in
the process of making such a check, seizable evidence fortuitously appearing may be taken.12 0 Courts have also held that the area around
potential accomplices who are found at the scene of an arrest, yet not
arrested themselves at the time, can properly be subjected to a Chimel
2
search.1
In several cases a suspect has been arrested in the front room of a
dwelling and allowed to go to another room in order to don appropriate
clothing for the trip to the station house. The act of an officer in following the arrestee into the other portion of the premises has been
uniformly sustained, and evidence so discovered has been ruled admissi117. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971), where the legality of an arrest was sustained
even though the police arrested the wrong man, for whose arrest they had no probable cause at
all.
118. 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (1970).
119. Id. at 221, 178 N.W.2d at 691.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4 (8th Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 401 U.S.
921 (1971); Guevara v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 531, 86 Cal. Rptr. 657 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1970); State v. Toliver, 5 Wash. App. 321, 487 P.2d 264 (1971).
121. United States v. Patterson, 447 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 748
(1972); United States v. Manarite, 314 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 448 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.),
ceri. denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971). But a lawful arrest "cannot legalize a personal search of a
companion for evidence against her simply because she was there." United States v. Berryhill, 445
F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971).
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ble. 2 1 Likewise, courts have not hesitated to sustain the reasonableness
of searching articles of clothing the arrestee is about to put on. 23 And
if the arrestee requests the officer to get an object from a drawer, he
may not complain of the seizure of evidence fortuitously discovered in
2
so doing.1 1
What result should be reached if when the arrest is being made for
a crime of violence, the arresting officer were to say, "Where's the
gun?" or words to that effect? Should a responsive answer permit the
officer to get the weapon from the indicated location, even if it is beyond

the bounds of the Chimel authorization? This problem is a particularly5
complex one since the separate analytical thrusts of Terry v. Ohio,'1
Miranda v. Arizona,12 and Chimel seem to converge on a single inci-

dent. Three jurisdictions have grappled with the problem.
In State v. Lane17 four officers forcibly entered the defendant's
apartment with drawn guns. 28 The defendant was advised that he was
under arrest, handcuffed, and was being given the Miranda warnings
when another officer interrupted, asking, "Do you have the gun?" The
defendant responded, "I don't have the gun. I wouldn't be dumb enough
to have it here."'' 2 As the weapon was not located at this time, the
controversy concerned the admissibility of the defendant's statement.
The court found no violation of Mirandain the sequence of events, since
122. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 252 So. 2d 371 (Fla. App. 1971) (motel room); People v.
Pearson, 126 I11.2d 166, 261 N.E.2d 519 (1970); People v. Mann, 61 Misc. 2d 107, 305 N.Y.S.2d
226 (Bronx Ct. 1969); Goodner v. State, -_ Tenn. App. -, 464 S.W.2d 389 (1970). See also
Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 960 (1972); United States
v. Kee Ming Hsu, 424 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 982 (1971). Chimel was
found inapplicable in each, but the indication was that it would have led to the same result. And
in Parker v. Swenson, 332 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Mo. 1971), the district court determined:
It may be that under this rationale, police had no authority to search petitioner's locker
when they first arrested him. However, when petitioner was given permission to collect his
personal effects, then opened the door and removed the paper bag, the contents of that bag
clearly came within the area subject to his control. There arose a substantial possibility that
in picking up the bag, petitioner was in the process of obtaining a weapon or acquiring
destructible evidence.
Id. at 1232-33. Cf. United States v. Broomfield, 336 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
123. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Falconer v. Pate, 319 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. II1. 1970);
Ala. App. __ ,255 So. 2d 602 (Crim. App. 1971); Grimes v. State, 244
Rennow v. State, So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1971).
124. Neam v. State, 14 Md. App. 180, 286 A.2d 540 (1972).
125. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
126. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
127. 77 Wash. 2d 860, 467 P.2d 304 (1970).
128. The facts are quite similar to those in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), a comparison which the court draws.
129. 77 Wash. 2d at - 467 P.2d at 305.
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the question was not designed to elicit incriminating information. The
question was viewed instead as the verbal equivalent of a frisk and, as
such, was quite proper. 30 If the defendant had told the officers where
he had hidden the weapon, that statement clearly could have been used

against him, either as evidence of guilt or as a basis for probable cause
to obtain a search warrant. It is not clear, however, whether the weapon
could have been seized immediately, without a warrant, if it had been

found in another area of the house.'
In People v. Brown 3 2 officers entered the residence of the defendant to arrest him on a homicide charge and observed cartridges on the
dresser. When they asked the defendant where he had put the weapon,
he indicated the dresser drawer. While again suggesting that the question, rather than raising a Miranda issue, might be viewed as a protective frisk, the court held that in any event the search of the dresser
33
drawer was reasonable under the Chimel standard.

134
Finally, the issue was squarely presented in State v. Michael.

Defendant was arrested in his home for fatally shooting his wife and,
as he was leaving the premises, an officer asked him, "Where is the
gun?"' 35 The defendant responded, "It's over there,"'' 31 pointing in the
130. Id. at _
467 P.2d at 306. Obviously the court is drawing an exceedingly thin line in
making this distinction. Whether the question is designed to elicit an incriminating response, it can
hardly be doubted that given the coercive circumstances any response made by the arrestee will
likely be incriminating. Furthermore, even thinner lines can be drawn if one pursues the analytical
ideal. The defendant was being arrested for armed robbery and the question asked was, "Do you
have the gun?" not "Do you have a gun?" i.e., the inquiry was as to a particular evidentiary item.
Certainly if the question asked was, "Do you have the money?" the response would be inadmissible
per Miranda, and if the contraband was thereby located it would probably be inadmissible as a
fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
131. One might speculate that the seizure would likely be sustained on a theory analagous
to that postulated in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), sustaining the search with probable cause of a seized vehicle without obtaining a warrant: whatever reasonable expectation of
privacy the defendant has in his residence has been legitimately intruded upon by the entry to make
the arrest. At this point, the question becomes, would it be a greater intrusion of privacy to walk
into the other room and seize the weapon now, or to proceed to a magistrate, obtain a warrant,
and return to seize it? From the defendant's viewpoint, the choice seems de minimis; as to others
who might also reside on the premises, their privacy is likely compromised more by a second
intrusion at a later time.
132. Ill. App. 266 N.E.2d 131 (1970).
133. [l1t is clear that the police would have found the gun without having to ask the
defendant where it was . . . . The dresser drawer was within the area of defendant's
immediate control and it is possible that he could have gained possession of the weapon.
The dresser was thus a proper object of a search pursuant to arrest . . ..
Id. at -,
266 N.E.2d at 135.
134. 107 Ariz. 126, 483 P.2d 541 (1971).
135. Id. at _ 483 P.2d at 543.
136. Id.
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direction of the bedroom he had left. The defendant's son then opened
3
a desk drawer in the bedroom and said to the officers, "Here it is."'1
After looking in the drawer and observing two weapons, the officer
closed the drawer. Later, the weapons were seized. The court held the
seizure reasonable, distinguishing Chimel on the theory that here the
138
defendant had effectively consented to the search.
V.

CONCLUSION

The impact of the Chimel decision should not be underestimated.
Perhaps no holding since Miranda v. Arizona139 has had a comparable
effect on the procedures used to investigate crime. 4 ' Indeed, Chimel is
likely to be of greater significance, because the introduction of evidence
seized incident to an arrest is far more common than the introduction
of a confession. Unquestionably, the Harris decision had so extended
the authority to search incident to an arrest that arresting officers were
constitutionally vested with a general exploratory searching power.
With the official discarding of the "mere evidence" rule,"' the simple
assertion of the possibility of the presence of evidence relevant to the
subject of the arrest, verified by the results, would justify the minute
search of an entire house or comparable area. Such power dangerously
approaches the use of "general warrants" to carry out indiscriminate
searches, the paramount evil at which the fourth amendment was di142
rected.
A constitutional retreat by the Court was therefore inevitable.
What was not expected, perhaps, was the severity of the limitations set
out in Chimel. They do more than merely force the officer to procure a
search warrant, for in many if not most productive searches incident to
an arrest prior to Chimel, the officer did not have probable cause to
believe that specifically describable items were in a designated location
137. Id.
138. Id. at __, 483 P.2d at 545. Cf. United States v. Marotta, 326 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
139. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140. In Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), Chimel was held to be applicable
prospectively only.
141. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
142. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See generally Barrett, Personal
Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46.
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at a particular time;' discovery was often wholly fortuitous. Thus,
rather than simply delaying the search, the effect of Chimel may be that
there can be no search at all.' 44

To say this, of course, is not to say that Chimel is necessarily
incorrect or undesirable. In fact, what has happened is that the preference given to searches made pursuant to search warrants has been revi-

talized, and the search incident to an arrest has been reduced to an
exception no longer threatening to virtually swallow the rule. Searches
incident to arrest, as with the other acknowledged exceptions requiring

no warrant-frisking, 5 items in plain view, 4 ' abandoned property, 47
vehicle searches, 4 ' effective consent,' 4 ' exigent circumstances, 50 and
customs searches at international borders' 51-exemplify the fourth
amendment's flexibility in continuing to preserve the constitutional bulwark against unwarranted governmental intrusion.
143. The fourth amendment requires that the warrant particularly describe "the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
144. Thus arises the fallacy in Justice Black's reasoning in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964), to the effect that the officers should have obtained a warrant before searching the trunk
of the vehicle. From aught that appears, the police had no reason to suspect that instrumentalities
of crime were to be found in the trunk.
145. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
146. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
147. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
148. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
149. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921), all recognizing the exception but
finding consent ineffective under the facts.
150. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
151. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exception recognized in dictum).
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